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On 17 July 2018, the European Court on Human Rights reminded again that occupation of
foreign lands and support of separatist regimes is a costly affair. This cost is not only
calculated in terms of monetary repercussions but also in terms of reputational losses. On
that day the chamber of the Court delivered a judgment in the case of Sandu and Others v
Russia and Moldova. This judgment is a new one in the line of cases dealing with a
breakaway region of Moldova – the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria.
The applicants in this case legally owed or rented land in Transnistria. At some point, the
separatist government started demanding them to pay fees for using this land and when
they failed to do so they were prevented from accessing their land. The ECtHR found
Russia in violation of the right to property (Article 1 of Protocol 1) and the right to an
effective remedy (Article 13).
This case is worth noting for a number of reasons. First, the Court has cemented its
findings from the previous cases that Russia is responsible for human rights violations that
take place on the territory of Transnistria. It means that Russia exercises effective control
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over this part of the Moldovan territory and the action of the separatist regime are
attributable to Russia. The Court established the fact that Russia is effectively controlling
Transnistria in Ilascu and others v Russia and Moldova. In that case the applicants were
detained and stood before a criminal court on the territory of Transnistria. The Court found
that the Convention was violated by both Moldova and Russia. Russia was responsible for
the violations committed by the Transnistrian administration. And Moldova was not active
enough in its attempts to liberate the applicants. That said, the Court established that
Moldova did not have effective control over that part of its territory.
In the subsequent Grand Chamber case of Catan and others v Moldova and Russia, the
Transnistrian authorities closed a number of schools in which Romanian was the language
of instructions. The Moldovan authorities helped to restore these schools on the territory
controlled by the Moldovan government and the Court was satisfied that they discharged
their human rights obligations. Russia was again found in violation of the Convention; this
time the right to education was violated (Article 2 of Protocol 1). In the more recent case of
Mozer and others v Russia and Moldova, the Grand Chamber of the Court found only
Russian authorities in violation of various articles of the Convention.
The Russian authorities have never accepted that they exercise effective control over this
territory. Moreover, the judges elected in respect of Russia traditionally write dissenting
opinions in ‘Transnistrian’ cases. For example, in the case of Mozer the Russian judge was
the only one of seventeen who voted against finding Russia in violation of the Convention.
The case of Sandu and others v Russia and Moldova clearly shows that the Court is not
going to back off from its position that Russia is exercising effective control on the territory
of Transnistria. It seems that if the situation does not change dramatically the applicants
from Transnistria can bring their applications exclusively against Russia. The Russian
authorities still have time to request the referral of this case to the Grand Chamber of the
Court but its success seems unlikely because the Chamber heavily relied on the previous
case law of the Court.
Second reason to pay attention to this case is the scale of affair. In this case, the Court
dealt with more than 1600 applications and awarded almost 2.5 million euros in just
satisfaction. It is not the biggest award ever allocated by the Court but perhaps one of the
highest number of applications dealt with in one case. This number of applications can be
explained by the fact that there were no effective remedies that could be used to prevent
these applications from landing in Strasbourg. In certain instances, for ‘legal black holes’
like Transnistria the European Court of Human Rights is the only place where the
arguments of the applicants can be heard and violations of their rights are at least
acknowledged.
The last but perhaps one of the most important reasons to keep an eye on this case is its
fate at the stage of execution. Russia is not the most eager client of the Committee of
Ministers – the body that supervises execution of the judgments of the European Court – in
general and it is even more so in the ‘Transnistrian’ cases. For example, the judgment in
Catan and others v Moldova and Russia which was delivered in 2012 has never been
implemented.
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Implementation of the Court’s judgments require three sorts of implementing measures.
The state first needs to pay monetary just satisfaction if it has been awarded. Just
satisfaction is usually the least controversial stage of implementation of a judgment.
Normally, the Court’s rewards are not significant for the respondent states. Of course, there
are noticeable exceptions in which just satisfaction is the key issue of controversy like
cases of Yukos v Russia or Cyprus v Turkey. In Catan, Russia failed even to pay just
satisfaction to the victims of violation.
The second set of implementation measures include individual measures which can
remedy the personal situation of the applicant. For instance, if an applicant is illegally
detained she should be released. In Sandu, the main violation concerned the right to
property and therefore it can be rectified by paying compensation and ensuring that access
to property is restored.
The most complex set of implementation measures are called general measures. These
measures often require legislative reforms to ensure that violations found by the Court will
not repeat. Unlike for example just satisfaction, these measures can be lengthy, difficult,
involve major legislative change and redistributions of resources. The state in question
should be willing to reform for these measures to be successful. If a state fails to comply
with much ‘easier’ monetary compensation it is unlikely that it will at all involve into much
more complex reforms. Unfortunately, lack of progress in Catan shows that Sandu’s fate
can be the same. It means that it is highly likely that the Russian authorities will delay
payment of just satisfaction in this case.
Although the Court is consistent in its approach to Transnistrian cases finding that Russia
exercises effective control over this territory there is a high chance that the Russian
authorities will also be ‘consistent’ and refuse to abide by the final judgment of the Court
despite a clear obligation to do so.
For more about implementation of judgments and many other questions of the European
Convention on Human Rights see F de Londras and K Dzehtsiarou, Great Debates on the
European Convention on Human Rights (Palgrave, 2018).
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